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TIGHTENING THE RING AROUND THE
POOR: DISCRIMINATION IN
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT ON THE




Throughout this nation's history, Americans have been
plagued with residential development that has been poorly
timed, located, and designed. Wisconsin and her southeastern
region have also suffered from this myopic residential develop-
ment planning. In order to curtail the adverse effects which this
poor planning has had upon the general health, safety, and
welfare of the public, zoning and other land use laws have been
enacted to regulate new growth.' This legal authority, as any,
* B.S. 1968, Michigan State University; M.S. 1972, University of Wisconsin-
Madison; J.D. 1975, Marquette University; member Massachusetts and Wisconsin
State Bars. The author has served as a legal consultant to various state, regional and
local governmental agencies concerning land use and related matters.
A major portion of this article was written by the author while employed as a legal
consultant to the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission. The author
wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the staff to the Commission in
developing this article. Much of the materials contained herein will form one chapter
of a much larger publication. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMIS-
SION, PLANNING LAW IN SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN, TEcHNIcAL REPORT No. 6, (2d ed.).
However, the opinions and views expressed within this article are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Commission.
1. See Wis. STAT. §§ 59.97, 59.971, 60.74, 61.35, 62.23(7), 87.30 (1975) which author-
ize and in some cases mandate that local units of government plan and zone the use
of lands. Wis. STAT. § 62.23(6) (1975) permits communities to develop official maps to
insure proper servicing of future development; and Wis. STAT. § 144.025(2)(a) (1975)
mandates that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) develop a comprehensive
long range water resources plan. The DNR is also authorized under Wis. STAT. ch.147
(1975) to regulate all point source discharges into the state's waters, to regulate solid
waste disposal sites, Wis. STAT. § 144.43 (1975), and mining, WIs. STAT. § 144.83
(1975). The Wisconsin Department of Transportation has authority under Wis. STAT.
§ 15.461 (1975) to plan for the development of the state's transportation systems. The
Wisconsin Legislature has also encouraged the formation of regional planning commis-
sions with the enactment of Wis. STAT. § 66.945 (1975) to anticipate and address those
problems which often transcend local government jurisdictions and affect particular
regions of the state.
At the federal level the United States Congress has expended a considerable
amount of funds in promoting development while at the same time conditioning such
funding on meeting certain standards designed to minimize the adverse effects of such
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is subject to misuse. Clearly, this has been the case with the
subject of this article - public land use policies which have the
effect of excluding individuals from certain residential areas on
the basis of wealth.
The focus of this article is upon exclusionary practices
which draw lines on the basis of wealth. 2 Although the underly-
ing motivations for exclusionary policies are frequently based
on racial, ethnic or religious biases, residential exclusion on the
basis of wealth sweeps more broadly. The mechanisms of exclu-
sion are of an economic nature; housing prices are a function
of factors such as lot size and availability. Consequently, the
impact of residential exclusionary practices on the basis of
wealth affect many families occupying the lower economic
strata who are not members of a minority group. For this rea-
son, this article places the problem in the framework of residen-
tial exclusion on the basis of wealth.
development. See 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970) which requires the consideration and, if
possible, the elimination of the adverse social, economic, and environmental effects of
federally funded highway projects; and 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) which
authorizes the federal "701" planning program designed to coordinate community
development projects. The federal government also attempts to ensure adequate and
safe housing for low and moderate income families under 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970 &
Supp. IV 1974). This housing program permits reductions in interest payments for
owners of rental housing designed for low income families. However, the housing must
meet certain federal standards for construction and location in order to qualify for the
reduction. Similarly under the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 4002
(Supp. V 1975), the Department of Housing and Urban Development may assist in
providing insurance against flooding, provided that the state and local communities
have adopted floodplain ordinances which prevent future development in flood prone
areas. Another example of a federally financed program that affects new development
is that encompassed in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1970)). In
particular 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. V 1975) mandates areawide waste treatment man-
agement plans.
2. It might be noted that in many parts of the United States exclusionary practices
have been implemented by local governments to prohibit population growth entirely,
or at least to slow its pace. However, a far more serious problem in the southeastern
region of Wisconsin is the erection of barriers on the basis of income. Although the two,
of course, can be and often are interrelated, the exclusionary practices in the region
are not prohibiting growth per se.
In addition, one might consider the fact that a particular land mass may only be
capable of sustaining a certain number of individuals because of soil type, water
supply, open space needs, etc. In that situation, population limits may well be neces-
sary but exclusionary policies may still operate to ensure, for example, that only the
wealthy can get in. The premise of this article is that in some instances the former
exclusionary practice based on unique natural resource limitations may well be justi-
fied, while the latter, exclusion on the basis of wealth, is not.
[Vol. 60:973
RESIDENTIAL DISCRIMINATION
The practices employed to exclude would be residents from
a given community on the basis of their wealth grow out of a
number of the police powers available to local units of govern-
ment. They variously include control over land use through
zoning, subdivision controls, building code ordinances, taxing
powers and others. Through the use of these police powers local
communities may, under the guise of promoting the health and
welfare of its citizens, effectively deprive low and middle in-
come families of the benefits of better educational and employ-
ment opportunities, recreational facilities, and municipal serv-
ices, as well as the more abstract but nonetheless important
benefits of living in a pleasant environment with open space.
In addition, the location of an individual's residence has wide
societal implications the importance of which is a question
beyond this article's subject matter.
Although leading commentators have recognized the prob-
lem for more than twenty years, 3 it is only in the last several
years that legal challenges have been directed against the ex-
clusionary practices used by many communities which ring the
large urban centers of the nation. The exclusionary practices
under attack promote public policies which attempt to inhibit
or prohibit suburban community population growth, making
the acquisition of inexpensive housing difficult.' Consequently,
a debate has surfaced within legal and land use planning circles
3. See Harr, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HAnv.
L. REv. 1051 (1953) where the author criticizes the isolationist view which the New
Jersey court upheld in this case; and, Harr, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom? -
In Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 986 (1954). But see the dissent of Justice Hall arguing
against exclusionary practices in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Glouchester Town-
ship, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). Justice
Hall was later vindicated in the now famous case of South Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). For a discussion of
the case, see the text accompanying notes 40-43 infra. See also Williams & Wacks,
Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Revisited, 1969
Wis. L. RPv. 827, which is a follow-up study involving the same opinion which Harr
criticizes above. The article states that "[tihe present system of land use control [in
Wayne Township] tends to subsidize antisocial conduct by local governments; it
actually puts a premium on kicking the poor around." Id. at 829.
4. The phenomenon of excluding certain peoples from i given locale is not new.
Prior to the large scale use of the governmental police powers, it was being successfully
achieved through private mechanisms, such as restrictions or covenants in deeds.
Judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants barring sales on the basis of the pur-
chaser's race was held unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Suits for breach against the covenantor were held
unconstitutional in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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over the propriety of these efforts of local governments to limit
growth, and thereby eliminate desirable housing opportunities
for people of all economic levels.'
If the issue was merely whether a given community could
exclude specific groups from living within its boundaries on the
basis of wealth, it could perhaps be more easily resolved. There
is a conflict, however, between the challenges to exclusionary
practices and the legitimate goals being pursued by local com-
munities, including the preservation of open space, the com-
munity's "timing" of development over an extended period of
time to prevent heavy fiscal burdens, and the desire to main-
tain property taxes at a reasonable level. The shortage of low
and moderate income housing, moreover, is often a regional
problem incapable of solution on a piecemeal community-by-
community basis. Nevertheless, many local governments (the
level of government at which the majority of land use decisions
are made) continue to ignore this fact, thereby aggravating the
situation. This is certainly the case, as will be seen, in the
southeastern region of Wisconsin. The result is a conflict be-
tween the advancement of several interests, all ostensibly seek-
ing to promote the general welfare.
This article will first briefly consider the emerging trends of
residential exclusionary practices in southeastern Wisconsin,
relying principally on studies prepared by the Southeastern
Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission.6 Some of the recent
judicial developments in this area will then be examined, and
finally, possible solutions to the problem in southeastern Wis-
consin will be discussed.
5. For comments on the recent controversy, see URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGE-
MENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH (1975). This publication contains a short but excellent
analysis of land use controls which exclude certain individuals or groups from a partic-
ular community. The publication also explores certain constitutional challenges to
these practices. Another book which deals with the issue is BURCHELL & LISTOKEN,
FUTURE LAND USE (1975). The work contains a compilation of papers by leading com-
mentators. Readers might also consult Cutler & Baxter, Highlights of the No
Growth/Slow Growth Movement, SEWRPC Newsletter Vol. 15, No. 4.
6. [Hereinafter SEWRPC]. Under Wis. STAT. § 66.945 (1975) local units of govern-
ment may be joined together under the jurisdiction of a regional planning commission
if certain elements of homogeneity exist between the municipalities, including similar-
ity in topography, geographic conformation, and social and economic interests. All
regional planning commissions formed under this authority may conduct research




II. EMERGING PATTERNS OF SANCTIONING RESIDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF WEALTH IN SOUTHEASTERN
WISCONSIN
The southeastern region of Wisconsin, bordering Lake
Michigan and lying just north of the Chicago, Illinois metropol-
itan area, is composed of seven counties, and contains five
percent of the state's land mass and forty percent of the state's
residents, making it Wisconsin's most populous and urbanized
region. Three of the largest and oldest cities of Wisconsin -
Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine - are located in its south-
eastern region. As with most of the metropolitan areas in the
United States, however, the most significant growth in popula-
tion and development is currently taking place in the suburban
and rural areas surrounding these established urban centers.
A familiar pattern common to many large metropolitan
areas of the United States has been occurring in the southeast
region; newer suburban and rural communities are seeking to
limit development to large spacious lots with expensive homes.
These limitations foreclose residential opportunities to lower
and moderate income families who in turn are dispropor-
tionately made up of the elderly and the minorities. Conse-
quently, these groups are forced to remain in the older and
larger cities of the region requiring the devotion of large
amounts of revenues to the provision of adequate housing and
other fundamental services. Yet, these older cities are finding
it increasingly difficult to accommodate those basic needs as a
result of their shrinking tax base caused in large part by the
migration to the suburbs and rural areas of their middle and
upper middle income families together with many commercial
enterprises.
The following economic and residential statistics on the re-
gion illustrate the difficulties confronting low and moderate
income families in obtaining adequate housing within com-
munities of their choice. They are not meant to be comprehen-
sive or conclusive indicators 7 but they do highlight the magni-
tude of the existing problem and suggest dim prospects for the
future unless ameliorative steps are taken.8
7. The statistics are drawn from more complete studies conducted by SEWRPC
over the past several years and are available upon request from SEWRPC.
8. A statistical analysis of residential housing trends is particularly important




As of 1970, ninety-eight percent of the population within
the southeastern region of Wisconsin was in an urban setting?
The counties with the highest population density are Milwau-
kee, Kenosha, and Racine, which also contain the older estab-
lished urban centers of the region.10 The patterns of growth
from 1963 to 1972 reveal a trend of population diffusion from
the older and major urban centers to the outlying areas of the
region (see Figure 1). Moreover, based on past trends, it is
projected that growth from the 1970s to the year 2000 will show
this migration to and buildup of the outlying counties continu-
ing at a marked rate" (see Figure 2).,
Another important demographic indicator which highlights
the transformation of the region over the past decade is the
distribution patterns of families by income range. Figure 3 il-
lustrates the overall rise in income levels of the region and
shows that the lowest household incomes are found in portions
of the older cities and in scattered rural areas. The most rapid
income growth and the highest average incomes are enjoyed by
suburban residents, particularly in Waukesha, Ozaukee, and
Washington Counties.
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, - N.J. -, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 44-49, infra.
9. The urban population, as defined by the United States Bureau of Census, is all
persons living in incorporated or unincorporated places of 2,500 persons or more, and
all persons living in other incorporated or unincorporated territories included within
"urbanized areas." 1 SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, A
REGIONAL LAND USE PLAN AND A REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR SOUTHEASTERN
WISCONSIN - 2000, PLANNING REPORT No. 25, at 54 (April, 1975) [hereinafter PLANNING
REPORT No. 25].
10. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, THE POPULATION OF
SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 11, at 5. Milwaukee County has the
largest number of persons per square mile, 4,448.3. Following Milwaukee in descending
order are: Racine, 506.9; Kenosha, 433.5; Waukesha, 417.6; Ozaukee, 230.8; Washing-
ton, 148.8; and Walworth, 113.9.
11. From 1950 to 1960, Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha Counties each experi-
enced more growth from net in-migration than from natural increase, while Kenosha,
Milwaukee, Racine, and Walworth Counties experienced more growth from natural
increase than from net in-migration. This pattern held from 1960 to 1970, although
Walworth later joined the first three counties named in experiencing more growth from
net in-migration than from natural increase. Milwaukee County was the only county
in the region to experience net out-migration from 1963 to 1972, resulting in an esti-
mated net regional out-migration of over 31,000 persons during this period. PLANNING
REPORT No. 25, supra note 9, at 53.
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B. Intraregional Shifts in Employment: The Increasing
Dispersion of Jobs to the Rural and Suburban Areas
The largest relative job growth within the region has oc-
curred in the outlying counties of Ozaukee, Walworth, Wash-
ington, and Waukesha. In 1963, nearly seventy-five percent of
the economic activity of the region, as measured by jobs, was
located in Milwaukee County with an additional fourteen per-
cent located in Kenosha and Racine Counties combined. Thus,
approximately eighty-nine percent of the regional economic
activity was located in these three urban counties. By 1972, the
proportion of the regional economic activity located in Milwau-
kee County had declined to sixty-eight percent, while the pro-
portion of the regional economic activity concentrated in the
three urban counties of Kenosha, Milwaukee, and Racine com-
bined had decreased to about eighty-two percent. A shift in
economic activity towards the suburban and rural areas of the
region and away from the older established economic centers
is evident (see Figure 4). If this trend continues, as is projected,
it will undoubtedly provide an even greater incentive for per-
sons to reside in the suburban and outlying areas, further dim-
inishing the economic vitality of the older cities. 12 But, as will
be shown, the residential opportunities will be primarily for
those in the upper income brackets, leaving the existing con-
centrations of lower and moderate income households further
from the new job centers and with little opportunity to share
in the new economic growth (see Figure 5).
12. An additional factor furthering the erosion of an economic base in the older
cities is the fact that a larger portion of the labor force in the suburban areas of
Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha Counties is employed in Milwaukee County.
The reverse, however, is not true; proportionately fewer residents of Milwaukee Coun-
try travel to jobs in the outlying counties. For example, Milwaukee County has only
1,628 employed in Ozaukee, 886 in Washington, and 13,340 in Waukesha. Travel
inventory data on the suburban area labor force indicates that 41 percent of the more
than 78,000 average weekday first work trips originate from Waukesha County with
work destinations in Milwaukee County; 36 percent of the more than 20,000 average
weekday first work trips originate from Ozaukee County and 18 percent of 22,000
average weekday first work trips begin in Washington County. PLANNING REPoRT No.
25, supra note 9, at 70. This situation typically results in tlhe suburban wage earners
spending their income earned in the urban centers in and around the communities
where they reside, while also paying property taxes there. The older urban centers,
therefore, in most instances will be drained of their potential revenues, resulting in a




1. Distribution of Households by County 3
As could be expected from the greater population increases
occurring in the outlying counties of the region, the greatest
percentage increase in households from 1960 to 1970 occurred
in those counties as well, particularly in Ozaukee, Washington,
and Waukesha Counties. The lowest growth rate in the number
of households among the seven counties between 1960 and 1970
was found in Milwaukee County, with that county's share of
the region's total decreasing significantly by four percent (see
Figure 6).
2. Extent of Housing Need
In a recent study, it was estimated that there were 96,100
households within the region in the year 1970 in need of a
change in housing. 4 This figure represents eighteen percent of
all households in the region. Of this total housing need, 69,600
households were classified as being in economic need only, in-
dicating that they presently occupy decent, safe, and sanitary
housing, but must pay more than thirty percent of their ad-
justed gross income to do so. 15 Furthermore, of the total figure
the study estimated that 15,186 are occupying substandard or
overcrowded housing and are also in economic need, indicating
13. Note the distinction between a household and a family as used here. A house-
hold is composed of all persons who occupy a single housing unit. A family is composed
of two or more persons living in the same housing unit who are related by blood,
marriage, or adoption. Thus, a household may consist of a family, a family and unre-
lated person(s) living in the same housing unit, unrelated persons living in the same
housing unit, or persons living alone. SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING
COMMISSION, A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN FOR SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN, PLANNING RE-
PORT No. 20, at 29 (1975).
14. Id. at 313. SEWRPC qualitatively defines housing need as "those households
which cannot secure decent, safe, and sanitary housing at a cost which is consistent
with their household income, as well as those households which are precluded from
obtaining decent, safe, and sanitary housing because of noneconomic constraints." Id.
at 311.
15. Id. at 313. Thirty percent was a figure chosen by SEWRPC as being a reasona-
ble amount of a monthly household income to secure decent, safe, and sanitary hous-
ing. Id. at 311. It was pointed out in that study that certain subgroups of the region's
population, such as the elderly, may have more severe problems than the population
as a whole. SEWRPC found that 31 percent of all elderly households were in housing
need although the major problem was economic need, with only 3 percent of this
subgroup occupying substandard or overcrowded housing. Thus, while the elderly can
obtain decent housing, they must do so with great financial hardship. Id. at 317.
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they are unable to secure adequate housing due to insufficient
income.'6
D. Land Use Patterns
The housing study mentioned above reveals that residential
land is disproportionately zoned for single family use as op-
posed to multifamily structures, the market to which low and
moderate income families may realistically turn." (See Figure
7 for residentially zoned land classified by density).
Moreover, the 1975 housing study revealed that the major-
ity of land zoned for low density residential use is located in
Waukesha County and the southern portion of Ozaukee
County, while the majority of land zoned for medium and high
density residential use is located in Milwaukee County and the
cities of Kenosha and Racine.'"
In addition, this study found that upon comparing reasona-
ble minimum floor area standards for housing developed by
SEWRPC' against the minimum floor area requirements of
various communities, a substantial number of urban communi-
ties in the region severely restricted or precluded housing which
might be within the financial reach of low and moderate in-
come households. For example, 64 of 87 urban communities in
the region precluded modest-sized two-bedroom single family
units as a result of their inflated floor area standards (see Fig-
ure 8). The two most restrictive counties were Waukesha,
where 22 of 25 communities, or 88 percent, exceeded the
SEWRPC minimum floor standards, and Ozaukee County
with six of eight communities, or 75 percent, exceeding these
standards."0
16. Id. at 313.
17. Modest sized single family units, as based on minimum standard floor require-
ments, are also severely restricted in many communities of the region.
18. Id. at 222.
19. Id. at 297-98. SEWRPC, in conjunction with its Technical and Citizen Advisory
Committee on Regional Housing Studies, developed minimum floor area standards for
living units. Basically, these standards represent the amount of total floor area needed
to assure decent living, sleeping, cooking and dining accommodations, sufficient stor-
age area, and adequate space for privacy so as to permit household members to carry
out basic family functions and allow for normal growth and maturation. Minimum
floor area standards can be justified when utilized to satisfy these needs. However, it
is apparent that a local community may arbitrarily adopt inflated minimum floor area
standards and thereby exclude the type of housing which is economically feasible for
low and moderate income households.
20. Id. at 227.
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Minimum floor area requirements adopted by communities
of the region severely restricted the development of inexpensive
multifamily housing, effectively eliminating from the housing
market efficiency units in 59 of 87 urban communities, one-
bedroom units in 56 communities, two-bedroom units in 42
communities, and three-bedroom units in 26 communities. It
was also found that a total of 16 of the 87 communities pre-
cluded multifamily housing altogether.21 Racine County, Ozau-
kee County, and Waukesha County were found to be the most
exclusionary (see Figure 9).
Further evidence that present residential patterns within
many of the newly developing outlying areas of the region are
excluding a viable range of housing for all income levels is
indicated by the number of subsidized housing units in a spe-
cific community or county. One such program which has been
in existence for some time is the federally financed section 235
housing, which is designed to assist low and moderate income
families in obtaining their own homes without committing
them beyond their means.2 As can be seen by Figure 10, the
greatest number of subsidized housing units as of 1973 were
located in Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine Counties.
A large proportion of those units were concentrated in the
larger central cities. That trend is further underscored when it
is considered that of the newly constructed units, 588 of 625,
or 94 percent, in Kenosha County were located in the City of
Kenosha. Similarly, 85 percent of the 1,622 new units con-
structed in Milwaukee County were in the City of Milwaukee,
and the City of Racine had 403 of the 820 new units constructed
in the County of Racine.23
It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of low in-
come households are disproportionately located in the cities of
Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine, with one area alone, the
21. Id. at 230.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV 1974). The program permits moderate income
households to purchase new or rehabilitated houses or condominiums which are valued
up to $21,600 for families of five or less and up to $25,200 for larger families. The
government insures the mortgages and will pay to the mortgage-lender the difference
between the payments at conventional interest rates and those payments if based on
one percent loans. The household under this program must pay 20 percent of their





northwest-central area of the City of Milwaukee, containing 21
percent or 24,600 of the low income households in the region.
The continued location of new subsidized housing units within
these economically segregated areas serves to reinforce these
trends.24
E. The Problem Synthesized
The provision of the above statistics and illustrations in no
way purports to be a complete picture of an extremely complex
and dynamic situation. They were offered in order to provide
some indication of the residential segregation within the south-
eastern Wisconsin region and the strong likelihood that homo-
geneous communities of affluence will continue to proliferate
if current trends and local community objectives prevail. These
newer enclaves of wealth have shielded themselves from low
and moderate income households primarily through the exer-
cise of police powers. Of those powers, zoning for low density
development (large lots), the exclusion of multifamily housing
units, and inflated minimum footage requirements for resi-
dences have combined to foreclose the availability of adequate
housing for a large number of individuals. Assuming that the
current trend of economic growth continues to shift more jobs
to the outlying areas, the individuals who make up the lower
and moderate income levels will be denied the opportunity to
share in this shift as well. Moreover, other socioeconomic prob-
lems currently plaguing the larger metropolitan areas of the
state can be expected to increase, including inadequate health
care facilities, inadequate schools and transportation systems,
the loss of important job centers, and the likely result that
cities, drained of economic vitality, will be unable to provide
24. The distribution of black households in the region closely parallels the concen-
trated pattern of low income households. Of all black households in the region in 1970
about 88 percent resided in housing analysis areas 18 and 20 in the City of Milwaukee
(see Figure 7). The only other housing analysis areas with significant numbers of black
households were in the City of Racine, included in portions of areas 43 and 44, and
the City of Kenosha, included in portions of areas 50 and 51 (see Figure 7). SEWRPC
estimates that approximately 50 percent of the black households were in housing need
in 1970. Id. at 334. For a definition of housing need, see note 17, supra. In a recent
article published by the Milwaukee Journal, January 23, 1977, at -, concerning the
black population of selected suburbs of Milwaukee, it was estimated from Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction data and information supplied by local municipal
officials that only 2,047 blacks lived in 34 suburban communities in five counties of
the southeastern region (Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Racine, Washington and Waukesha).
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quality services overall in the face of increasing demands. 5
Finally, balanced against these immediate problems of the
low and moderate income households are the legitimate goals
of local governments concerned with property values, fiscal
burdens, the provision of municipal services, and other such
problems. The question, then, becomes whether local govern-
ments may promote their own local objectives without also
addressing regional problems and concerns associated with the
low and moderate income households.
This is the problem currently facing the southeastern region
of Wisconsin and its various units of government. Some com-
munities have taken steps to ameliorate the problems, while
others perpetuate it, either intentionally or unintentionally, by
excluding low and moderate income groups altogether. At the
present time neither the Wisconsin Legislature nor the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin have squarely addressed the issue.
Thus, an examination of the approaches taken in other juris-
dictions in dealing with this problem may prove instructive.
IlH. RECENT CASE LAW PERTAINING TO EXCLUSIONARY
PRACTICES: THE SPLIT AMONG JURISDICTIONS
Within the past several years, a number of communities
throughout the United States have attempted to manage or
limit their growth through a variety of methods. The majority
continue to rely most heavily upon their police powers to ac-
complish these goals rather than pursuing what usually are the
more costly alternatives of outright purchase for public owner-
ship, easements or leaseback arrangements. As the number of
these communities attempting to limit their growth increases,
the amount of litigation has correspondingly risen. But the
courts of the various jurisdictions that have faced the problem
of exclusionary practices have been anything but consistent in
addressing the problem.
The legal issues in these actions often pit the fundamental
rights of individuals and regional problems against a local cum-
munity's delegated right under the state's police power to regu-
late the use of land in furtherance of the health, safety, or
general welfare of its residents. Thus, the conflicts resemble in
25. For the findings of the Wisconsin Legislature on this matter, see text accompa-
nying notes 139-40, infra.
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many respects the problems emerging in southeastern Wiscon-
sin. An analysis of some of the leading cases is provided to
illustrate the basic issues involved and to show the current split
among the courts in the disposition of these issues.
A. Successful Attacks on Exclusionary Practices
1. Pennsylvania
The Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania was one
of the first courts in the country to carefully scrutinize local
governmental efforts to erect legal barriers to newcomers. In
National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board
of Adjustment, the court struck down a zoning ordinance which
required a minimum of four acres per building lot in certain
residential districts of the township.26 The court found the
township's zoning ordinance was attempting to limit growth for
the express purpose of avoiding "further burdens, economic
and otherwise," and, therefore, was exclusionary and not in
furtherance of the general welfare.Y
More recently, the Pennsylvania court was again confronted
with the problem of a community's unwillingness to accept
population growth and its attendant problems in Appeal of
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.21 There the community's technique of
zoning for large lots had the effect of maintaining present popu-
lation levels, a result which the court would not countenance
on a community wide basis. 29 Of particular importance in this
opinion was the supreme court's ruling that local governments
could not insulate themselves from regional or areawide prob-
lems. In clarifying this issue the court stated,
Planning considerations and other interests can justify rea-
sonably varying minimum lot sizes in given areas of a com-
munity .... [But] the implication of our decision in
National Land is that communities must deal with the prob-
lems of population growth. They may not refuse to confront
the future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively re-
strict population to near present levels. It is not for any given
26. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
27. Id. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612.
28. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
29. In this opinion the court did not expressly state another ramification of large
lot zoning which it would develop in subsequent opinions; that the few individuals who
could get into the community would be those who could afford the greater expense of
the increased lot size.
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township to say who may or may not live within its confines
while disregarding the interests of the entire area.30
In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 31 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again reviewed community ex-
clusionary policies. In that case a private corporation had re-
quested a building permit to construct apartments within the
township. That request was denied on the grounds that the
land in question was zoned RA-1 Residential, a classification
which did not permit apartments. But the court, taking notice
of the fact that of 11,589 acres in the township only 80 acres
were zoned for apartment construction, concluded that the
township zoning ordinance was exclusionary and did not pro-
vide an adequate amount of land for apartments. In addition,
the court noted that while these types of regulatory devices
were not totally exclusionary to newcomers, they did have the
effect of "selective admission" because they screened out indi-
viduals and families who could not afford or who did not wish
to live in single family homes.32 What was needed instead, the
court emphasized, was an affirmative program by the township
that provided a variety and choice of housing for all income
levels and which would satisfy an equitable share of the re-
gional or metropolitan area housing needs. 33 Having found this
need to exist and the Township of Willistown's ordinance lack-
ing in this respect, the court declared the ordinance unconsti-
tutional and ordered that a permit be issued to construct the
apartment dwellings .3
30. 439 Pa. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69. This emphasis on a regional perspective
could also be found in another case decided in the same year as Kit-Mar. In that case,
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), a township's zoning plan restricted
the construction of apartment or multifamily dwellings. Failing to provide for this type
of dwelling obviously precluded a number of individuals who could not afford single
family detached houses or who did not wish to make that type of investment and the
court therefore found the restriction to be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
Moreover, the court stated that "[a] restriction does not become any the more reason-
able because once in a while a developer may be able to show the hardship necessary
to sustain a petition for a variance." Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397. The court also
emphasized that the question involved was not whether the township must zone all of
its land for apartments but whether the township could preclude them entirely.
31. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
32. Id. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468.
33. Id. In this portion of the opinion the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted with
emphasis from South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (1975), the landmark case of its neighboring state, New
Jersey. The case is discussed infra, notes 40-43 and accompanying text.




In 1975 the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down the
landmark decision of Southern Burlington County N.A.A. C.P.
v. Township of Mount Laurel,5 sustaining a constitutional at-
tack on Mount Laurel's policy of maintaining a low density
development. The township's objectives in employing the var-
ious restrictive measures were to halt the sprawling urbaniza-
tion of the Philadelphia metropolitan area into the township
and to encourage only those land uses which would be benefi-
cial to the local tax rate. To effectuate those objectives it in-
creased the lot sizes and lot frontage requirements. Conse-
quently, the ordinance precluded the construction of multifam-
ily units or even smaller detached single family homes and
heavily restricted the occupancy of the limited number of
available apartments, thereby making it impossible for low and
moderate income families to acquire housing in the com-
munity.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, when confronted with
these facts, made the observation that the source of local au-
thority to zone lands for the general welfare emanates directly
from the state and that all police power enactments must con-
form to the basic state constitutional requirements of substan-
tive due process and equal protection of the laws .3 And where,
as here, the local regulations have a "substantial external im-
pact" on the welfare of state citizens residing outside of the
particular community, that welfare must be acknowledged and
served. 7 On this basis, the court invalidated those portions of
the ordinance which did not take into account the welfare of
these outlying citizens. In some of the strongest language of any
jurisdiction on this matter, the court concluded that Mount
been issued, its municipal services would be overburdened. However, in directing that
the permit be issued for the construction of the apartments, the court did require that
the developer comply "with the administrative requirements of the zoning ordinance
and other reasonable controls, including building, subdivision, and sewage regulations,
which are consistent with this opinion." 462 Pa. at 450, 341 A.2d at 468-69.
35. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
36. The court noted that the N. J. CONST. art. 1, par. 1 reads: "All persons are by
nature free and independent, and have certain natural unalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." 67 N.J. at
-, 336 A.2d at 725. Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 1, has similar language.
37. 67 N.J. at -, 336 A.2d at 726.
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Laurel, as well as all municipalities in New Jersey, must, in the
development of their land use regulations,
make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice
of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot fore-
close the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for
low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must
affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent
of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective
regional need therefor.38
In the most recent development, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in a lengthy opinion reaffirmed the Mount Laurel deci-
sion in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison.5 It
found that "general welfare" as that term is used in the zoning
enabling legislation "requires the consideration of regional
housing needs."4 In particular it stated that "[i]t goes with-
out saying that the statutory and constitutional prohibition, by
judicial construction, of zoning to exclude, encompasses exclu-
sion by race as well as by economic circumstances."4 Finding
that the Madison ordinance did not address these regional
needs the court struck down those portions of the ordinance
which were exclusionary.
In discussing the general considerations underlying housing
allocation, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that it
would be preferable if an administrative planning agency,
rather than the courts, would allocate fair shares of low income
housing among the municipalities. It noted that an administra-
tive planning agency organized for a predetermined region and
operating under authorizing legislation with some presumed
38. Id. at -_, 336 A.2d at 724 (emphasis added). Recently a New Jersey trial court
with the benefit of the Mount Laurel decision has forged a remedy for exclusionary
zoning involving 23 of 25 municipalities of Middlesex County. In Urban League of
Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of the Borough of Cateret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359
A.2d 526 (1976), the court specifically identified a region and the fair share allocation
of low and moderate income housing that must be supplied for that region. It went on
to strike down 11 municipal ordinances for not supplying their fair share of low and
moderate income housing and allocated the respective units among the municipalities
to meet regional needs. As part of its allocation process, it considered the available
acreages in each municipality that were capable of sustaining this type of housing, the
projected growth figures, those lands which were environmentally sensitive, the
amount of land already developed, the provision of sewer utilities, and the amount of
presently overzoned land use categories.
39. - N.J. - , 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
40. Id. at , 371 A.2d at 1225.
41. Id. at -, 371 A.2d at 1225-26.
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expertise would be in a more advantageous position to make
the proper and fair allocation of housing for the municipalities
and subregions within its jurisdiction. A court, on the other
hand, would be dealing only with an isolated attack on the
zoning ordinance of the particular defendant municipality.2
However, since the New Jersey legislature had not acted to
establish an administative planning agency, and given the
court's earlier interpretation of the state constitution and zon-
ing enabling legislation in Mount Laurel, it felt compelled to
provide relief in Oakwood at Madison. The court did so by,
first, directing that a permit be issued to the corporate plain-
tiffs to construct a housing project on their property according
to the corporate plans which would guarantee that at least
twenty percent of the constructed units would house low and
moderate income families;4 3 and, secondly, by ordering the
township to submit a revised ordinance that would "create the
opportunity for a fair and reasonable share of the least cost
housing needs of Madison's region. ..
42. Id. at __, 371 A.2d at 1218.
43. Id. at., 371 A.2d at 1227. The court specifically provided that the issuance
of the permit will be executed under the supervision of the trial judge and furthermore
that the issuance is conditioned upon the lands being ecologically and environmentally
suited to the degree of density and type of development plaintiffs propose.
44. Id. at -, 371 A.2d at 1222. The court defined region as "that general area
which constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of which the subject munici-
pality is a part, and from which the prospective population of the municipality would
substantially be drawn, in the absence of exclusionary zoning." Id. at -, 371 A.2d
at 1223. It cited as a definition of a "housing market area" the "geographic area in
which housing units are in competition for the people who are seeking housing." Id. at
-, 371 A.2d at 1215. The court noted that "[tihe factors which draw most candi-
dates for residence to a municipality include not only, for employed persons and those
seeking employment, reasonable proximity thereto of jobs and availability of transpor-
tation to jobs." Id. at -, 371 A.2d at 1219.
In determining what constitutes a fair share allocation of lower cost housing, the
supreme court provided that the trial court could rely on studies submitted into evi-
dence, giving them whatever weight they merit, but the trial court itself would not be
required to adopt quotas of fair shares in housing. Id. at _, 371 A.2d at 1223.
In its direction to the township to revise its ordinance the New Jersey Supreme
Court specifically required that the revision should as a minimum allocate substantial
areas for single family homes on very small lots; that it should reduce those zones
requiring large lots; that those zoning districts permitting multifamily housing should
be increased; and the present restriction and requirement on the multifamily housing
zones and planned unit developments should be modified to eliminate the undue cost




In the New York case of Berenson v. Town of New Castle,45
the plaintiff sought to have a parcel of land rezoned in order
to provide for the construction of a large condominium com-
plex. When the Town of New Castle, in an effort to preserve
its "rustic" nature, would not grant the rezoning, plaintiff chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. But the
appellate court formulated the issue as "under what circum-
stances, if at all, a zoning board may adopt a regulation that
would prohibit entirely the construction of any new multiple
resident housing within its borders ... .
In order to address this issue properly, the New York Court
of Appeals noted that certain questions of fact would have to
be resolved at the trial level. To assist the lower courts in
considering those questions, the court of appeals set forth the
following test. First, lower courts should consider whether there
exists a properly balanced and well ordered plan for the com-
munity.47 To answer that question, lower courts must ascertain
the type, quantity, and quality of the present housing and
whether it adequately meets the needs of the local com-
munity." In addition, the courts must consider whether new
housing must be developed and if so what form it should take.
49
Having answered those questions, the next step is to con-
sider "regional needs and requirements."5 Specifically, the
court of appeals ruled, "[tihere must be a balancing of the
local desire to maintain the status quo within the community
and the greater public interest that regional needs be met.""1
The New York court indicated that it was fully aware that
zoning traditionally operates only within the confines of the
45. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
46. Id. at 107, 341 N.E.2d at 240, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
47. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
48. Id.
49. In its opinion the court reviewed many of its recent decisions on zoning. It
specifically mentioned its approval of the programs for phased growth that it sanc-
tioned in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). However, the court
re-emphasized that "'community efforts at immunization or exclusion' would not
be countenanced." 38 N.Y.2d at 108, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 679, citing
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 152.




particular jurisdiction exercising the zoning powers, and went
on to say that it must be recognized that zoning often has
impact beyond the specific jurisdictional boundaries. There-
fore, it ruled that the lower courts must consider "not only the
general welfare of the residents of the zoning township, but
should also consider the effect of the ordinance on the neigh-
boring communities."52 In summarizing its ruling, the New
York Court of Appeals pointed out that zoning was primarily
a legislative tool and that ultimately the achievement of sound
regional planning would find its greatest encouragement
through programs initiated by the state legislature. Neverthe-
less, it stressed,
[W]hile the people of New Castle may fervently desire to be
left alone by the forces of change, the ultimate determination
is not solely theirs .... Until the day comes when regional,
rather than local, governmental units can make such deter-
minations, the courts must assess the reasonableness of what
the locality has done.53
It is important to emphasize that the Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and New York courts recognized in their decisions that
local governments have a right to promote and protect other
interests of their citizens, such as their health and safety, as
well as ecological considerations. But the importance of these
decisions is that they stand for the proposition that although
it is permissible for the local governments to advance these
other interests, they must also provide housing for all income
levels. 4
52. However, the court did say that "a town need not permit a use solely for the
sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently provided for in an
adequate manner." Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
53. Id. at 243 [emphasis added].
54. In addition to the cases analyzed in the main text, a Michigan court has stated
that "the strictly local interests of a municipality must yield if such conflict with the
overall state interests of the public at large. This is not meant to be complete limitation
on zoning powers but rather, where certain uses are concerned, a balancing must be
reached between the effect of local considerations, concerns and desires against the
greater public interest." Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 218, 192
N.W.2d 322, 328 (1971). In searching for that balance, the court said that "general
policy considerations must be ascertained before determining whether local enact-
ments adversely affect a wider interest. If such are affected, it remains necessary to
weigh those interests against local concerns." Id. at 219, 192 N.W.2d at 329.
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4. Federal Court Decisions
In City of Hartford v. Hills,55 a federal district court issued
an injunction preventing seven towns which surround Hartford
from receiving federal community development grants because
of their exclusion of low income housing. 8 The importance of
this decision is that a federal court interpreted the federal stat-
utes to condition federal grants upon local governments' con-
sideration of low and moderate income housing needs. Specifi-
cally, the court found that there was a clear congressional
objective in "providing decent housing and a suitable living
environment and expanding economic opportunities, princi-
pally for persons of low and moderate income." 7 Furthermore,
the court cited the plaintiff's argument that there were specific
national priorities governing the granting of community devel-
opment monies, one of which was to reduce "the isolation of
income groups within communities and geographical areas and
the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of
neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing
opportunities for persons of lower income."58 The method, as
the court pointed out, that Congress chose to achieve these
national goals was to require the community applying for com-
munity development grants to complete a Housing Assistance
Plan detailing the community's present housing stock, identi-
fying its housing needs, and establishing goals for providing
publicly assisted housing and the location of that housing. 9 In
the City of Hartford case, the Federal District Court of Con-
necticut found that six of the seven communities surrounding
Hartford had failed to estimate the number of low income per-
sons expected to reside within their borders, and the remaining
community had underestimated the need." In addition, it
55. 408 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1975).
56. The grants would have been available under the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974).
57. 408 F. Supp. at 898, citing 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
58. 408 F. Supp. at 898.
59. The court stressed that Congress had intended that these plans play a key role
in determining for which communities development monies may be granted "by ex-
cluding [them] from the list of application requirements which might be waived by
the Secretary [of HUD]." 408 F. Supp. at 898, interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 5304(b)(3)
and (4) (Supp. IV 1974).
60. 408 F. Supp. at 902. Six of the towns had submitted applications with a zero
"expected to reside" figure and this, as the plaintiffs pointed out, "was not an accurate
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found that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
had abused her discretion in approving the applications with-
out requiring that realistic estimates of housing needs be sub-
mitted. Consequently, the seven towns were enjoined from
drawing federal monies under the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974.1
In the recent case of Hills v. Gautreaux,12 the United States
Supreme Court held that where racially segregated housing has
been established in violation of federal law with the assistance
of governmental agencies, federal court remedial powers are
broad and flexible. In Gautreaux the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development was found to have
sanctioned and assisted the racially discriminatory public
housing program of the Chicago Housing Authority by know-
ingly funding public housing projects whose sites had been se-
lected to maintain segregated housing patterns in the City of
Chicago. Since the relevant housing market over which the two
agencies had authority extended beyond Chicago's city limits
into the suburbs, a metropolitan-area remedy could be granted
requiring the agencies to consider publicly subsidized housing
for Chicago's suburbs.63 In so holding, the Supreme Court reaf-
estimate of the housing needs which existed among persons in this category." Id. at
899.
The court noted that according to HUD regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(b)(2)
(1975), this estimate was to be determined from "lower income persons and families
'planning or expected to reside in the community as a result of planned or existing
employment facilities.'" 408 F. Supp. at 899 n. 44.
61. The court added that "[tihe towns may seek to obtain a new approval of these
grant applications from HUD. This injunction may be lifted upon the filing with the
court of such a new approval." Id. at 907.
62. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
63. This decision is notable also for its clarification of the Supreme Court's earlier
ruling in the controversial school desegregation case of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974), where the Court held that only upon a showing of either an interdistrict
violation or a significant segregative effect in suburban school districts may a federal
district court equitably decree consolidation of those school districts with those of the
city for remedial purposes.
In Hills the Court explained that Milliken "was actually based on fundamental
limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of
local and state governmental entities. That power is not plenary. It may be exercised
'only on the basis of a constitutional violation.'" 425 U.S. at 293, quoting Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 738, and Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). But the Court distinguished Milliken, stating: "Nothing in the
Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order
parties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond
the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred." 425 U.S. at 298.
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firmed the principle that "[o]nce a constitutional violation is
found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the
remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional viola-
tion.' ,6
The Supreme Court's holding in Gautreaux that federal
courts enjoy broad equitable powers to remedy unconstitu-
tional housing systems is certainly welcome. However, it re-
mains quite difficult to establish a violation of the United
States Constitution in housing cases not involving patently
racially discriminatory conduct. The Connecticut federal dis-
trict court in City of Hartford v. Hills has broken new ground
and it is yet unclear how the other courts in the federal system
will treat the issue of exclusionary practices based on wealth.
Exclusionary practices have been upheld in a large variety of
contexts, as demonstrated by the following cases.
B. Unsuccessful Attacks on Exclusionary Practices
In 1975 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the land-
mark decision of Construction Industry Association v. City of
Petaluma.5 As a result of its location on the fringe of the San
Francisco metropolitan area, the city of Petaluma was experi-
encing substantial growth pressures. In an effort to protect its
small town character, low density population, and open space,
it adopted a five-year housing and zoning plan which fixed
quotas on the number of multiple dwelling units that could be
built in any one year. This was done in the face of demands for
that type of housing in the region which far exceeded the num-
ber of homes allocated under the plan.6" Even though this de-
The test is whether an order directing relief beyond city limits will "necessarily entail
coercion of uninvolved governmental units .. " Id.
Applying these principles, the Court noted that the housing agencies in Gautreaux
had been found by the lower courts to have violated the fifth amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, whereas the suburban school districts in Milliken had not violated
the law. Furthermore, HUD and the Chicago Housing Authority were empowered to
operate beyond Chicago city limits in formulating housing plans. Consequently, a
metropolitan area remedy in Gautreaux would "do no more than take into account
HUD's expert determination of the area relevant to the [plaintiff's] housing oppor-
tunities and will thus be wholly commensurate with the 'nature and extent of the
constitutional violation."' 425 U.S. at 300.
64. Id. at 293-94.
65. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
66. [U]ndisputed expert testimony at trial [indicated that if Petaluma's
plan were to be adopted by municipalities throughout the San Francisco region]
the impact on the housing market would be substantial. For the decade 1970 to
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mand was present and the Petaluma plan failed to address a
representative share of this need, the circuit court of appeals
in dictum stated that it could not force a local community to
look beyond its immediate jurisdiction in providing adequate
housing. Rather, it stated,
If the present system of delegated zoning power does not
effectively serve the state interest in furthering the general
welfare of the region or entire state, it is the state legislature's
and not the federal courts' role to intervene and adjust the
system .... [The federal court is not a super zoning board
and should not be called upon to mark the point at which
legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the com-
munity are outweighed by legitimate regional interests. 7
Thus, the court in Petaluma adhered to the traditional and
narrow view of abstension from interference with the exercise
of local governmental police power in land use zoning and re-
jected the view of courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New
York that local communities must recognize and assume some
of the burden of regional growth.
In several recent cases the United States Supreme Court
has dealt with various aspects of local community exclusionary
practices based on wealth, but it has never squarely faced the
1980, the shortfall in needed housing in the region would be about 105,000 units
(or 25 percent of the units needed). Further, the aggregate effect of a prolifera-
tion of the Plan throughout the San Francisco region would be a decline in
regional housing stock quality, a loss of the mobility of current and prospective
residents and a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing available to
income earners with real incomes of $14,000 per year or less.
Id. at 902.
67. 522 F.2d at 908. Three other constitutional arguments were made. They were:
(1). The right to travel: the court found that individuals within the city have no
standing to raise this issue on hehalf of parties allegedly excluded from living in
Petaluma. Id.
(2). Substantive due process: the court found that since the exclusion did not
affect a fundamental right or employ a suspect classification (the exclusion affected
only types of housing), the city need only show a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest. Advancement of the general welfare by promoting family values, quiet
seclusion and clear air was a legitimate state interest. Thus, the plan was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable and the due process rights of the developers were not
violated "merely because a local entity excercises in its own self-interest the police
power fully delegated to it by the state." Id.
(3). Discrimination against Interstate Commerce: the court stated that the local
regulation was "rationally related to the social and environmental welfare of the com-
munity and does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt
its required uniformity." Id. at 909.
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legality of such practices. These cases do, however, reveal the
Court's attitude that local communities retain broad discretion
in allocating land use. Additionally, the access to federal courts
for litigating these issues has been narrowed by the Court's
interpretation of the standing requirement under the "cases
and controversies" component of article III of the United States
Constitution. Cases which illustrate these points are discussed
below.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,11 the Village of Belle
Terre, a community located on Long Island, New York, with a
population of 700 residing in 220 homes, restricted the use of
land within its jurisdiction to one-family dwellings. The ordi-
nance prohibited lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity
houses, or multiple dwelling houses. Furthermore, the village
ordinance excluded three or more unrelated persons from living
within one household as a family. 9 One practical effect of this
restriction was to prevent those individuals who ordinarily
could not afford to live in Belle Terre from grouping together
to make it economically feasible to reside within the village
limits. In this case, it was a group of students who attended a
nearby state university and who were renting a house in the
village.
These student-tenants along with the owners of the resi-
dence challenged the ordinance on the following grounds:
that it interferes with a person's right to travel; that it inter-
feres with the right to migrate to and settle within a State;
. . . that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of
government; that the restriction of those whom the neighbors
68. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
69. "Family," as defined in the ordinance means:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A num-
ber of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be
deemed to constitute a family.
416 U.S. at 2.
In Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974), a case similar to the
facts here, the Village of Shorewood, Wisconsin, adopted an ordinance which pre-
cluded four or more persons who were unrelated from occupying the same dwelling
unit. The district court found that the definition of family employed by the Village
was not supported by any rational basis consistent with the traditional zoning objec-
tives. Thus, it was found to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 459. However, after Belle Terre the federal court of appeals vacated
and remanded the Timberlake case. 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975).
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do not like trenches on the newcomers' rights of privacy; that
it is of no rightful concern to villagers whether the residents
are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical
to the Nation's experience, ideology, and self-perception as
an open, egalitarian, and integrated society.7"
The majority of the Supreme Court could find nothing in
the record which would violate the right to travel, nor did the
ordinance, in the Court's opinion, affect any "fundamental"
right guaranteed by the Constitution. 71 Lacking an infringe-
ment of fundamental rights, the Court found that the ordi-
nance need merely bear a "rational relationship to a
[permissible] state objective. ' 7 Such a permissible state
objective did exist, and the Court found that "[a] quiet place
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. '73
In dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall did not question the major-
ity's recognition of the wide discretion that local zoning author-
ities enjoy when enacting zoning ordinances. Permissible zon-
ing objectives included "restricting uncontrolled growth, solv-
ing traffic problems, keeping rental costs at a reasonable level,
and making the community attractive to families. ' 74 It was
Justice Marshall's conclusion, however, that the concededly
legitimate aims of the ordinance could not justify the resultant
infringement on the students' fundamental rights of associa-
tion and privacy under the first and fourteenth amendments.75
The ordinance, in his view, went beyond the constitutionally
permissible land use restrictions since it "undertakes to regu-
late the way people choose to associate with each other within
the privacy of their homes."76 Consequently, he would have
found the ordinance unconstitutional. 77
70. 416 U.S. at 7.
71. Specifically the Court found that the ordinance was "not aimed at transients.
* It involves no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others .... It
involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting...
the right of association . . . the right of access to the courts . . . or any rights of
privacy . .. " Id. [citations omitted].
72. Id. at 8.
7&. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 17.
77. On the freedom of association issue, Mr. Justice Marshall argued that constitu-
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In another Supreme Court decision, City of Eastlake v. For-
est City Enterprises, Inc.," a real estate developer challenged
a provision in the city charter that required land use changes
to be ratified by fifty-five percent of the voters in a city elec-
tion. The developer had sought to have a parcel of land which
he owned rezoned to permit multifamily, high rise apartment
buildings. The request was approved by the city council and
the developer applied to the planning commission for parking
approval. The city planning commission rejected the applica-
tion on the basis that the request for rezoning had not been
submitted to the voters for ratification. The developer then
challenged the constitutionality of this "spot" referendum pro-
cess, arguing that it constituted a delegation of legislative
power to the people without appropriate standards to guide
their decision, thereby depriving the landowner of property
without due process. This challenge had been successful before
the Ohio Supreme Court where it was held that "[tlhe East-
lake charter provision . . . blatantly delegated legislative au-
thority, with no assurance that the result reached thereby
would be reasonable or rational. '79
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the referendum procedure was "a basic instrument of
democratic government ' 80 and within the powers reserved to
the people under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
The significance of this decision is that it permits the voters of
a local communnity to preclude a particular land use without
reference to articulable standards. Consequently, the rezoning
tional protection is extended not only to political associations but to social and eco-
nomic ones as well, and that the right to privacy is secured by the Constitution in
permitting an individual the freedom "to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his home .... [P]rivacy is ... the right to be left alone." Id. at 15,
16, [citations omitted]. He further pointed out that the ordinance in question permit-
ted persons related by blood or marriage, be it two or twenty, to live in a single
household, but it limits to two the number of unrelated persons bound by profession,
love, friendship, religions, political affiliation, or mere economics. Id. at 16.
78. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
79. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324
N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975). It is important to note that the Ohio Supreme Court's finding
of unconstitutionality was based on the Constitution of the United States and not that
of Ohio.
80. 426 U.S. at 679. Compare the view expressed in the concurring opinion of Ohio
Supreme Court Justice Stem, where he observed, "There is no subtlety to this; it is
simply an attempt to render change difficult and expensive under the guise of popular
democracy." 41 Ohio St. at 200, 324 N.E.2d at 248.
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proponent is denied any meaningful opportunity to have its
proposal considered on its merits, and the proposal may, in
fact, be denied for illegal but undiscoverable purposes.
In yet another important development in this area of law,
the United States Supreme Court narrowed the avenue for at-
tacking the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance creating
residential patterns exclusive of low or moderate income hous-
ing in Warth v. Seldin. 1 In Warth, petitioners claimed that the
zoning ordinance enforced by the zoning, planning and town
boards of the Town of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester, New
York, which allocated 98 percent of the land to single-family
detached houses, effectively excluded persons of low and mod-
erate incomes from living in the town. This, the petitioners
argued, was in contravention of the first, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution. The United
States Supreme Court never reached the merits of the case,
however, finding that each of the various petitioners lacked
standing to litigate the questions and affirmed the lower courts'
dismissals. 82
One group of petitioners asserted standing as persons of low
or moderate income harmed by respondents' enforcement of
the ordinance against developers and builders with the effect
of suitable housing being priced out of the petitioners' afforda-
ble range. The Court held that the group lacked standing be-
cause of their failure to establish that the challenged practice
harmed them specifically, and that they "personally would
benefit in a tangible way from the courts' intervention;" '83 there
was no showing that any particular housing projects which
would have been built but for the ordinance would have met
petitioners' needs. The Court declined to specify the precise
personal interest which a zoning ordinance challenger must
possess, but conceded that a present contractual interest in a
proposed housing project was not an indispensible require-
81. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
82. Id. at 517-19. In reviewing the elements of standing the Supreme Court ruled
that the Constitution requires that a plaintiff must allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdic-
tion... " Id. at 498 (emphasis in the original). Moreover, petitioners must satisfy the
prudential rules of standing, that is, the claim must be based on a constitutional or
statutory provision which grants to persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial
relief. Id. at 500.
83. Id. at 508-09.
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ment. However, it suggested that "usually the initial focus
should be on a particular project. '84
A second group of petitioners asserted standing as taxpay-
ers of Rochester forced to assume the increased tax burden
resulting from Penfield's failure to absorb some of the lower
tax-based housing concentrated in Rochester. The Court con-
cluded that the group lacked standing, basing its decision on
the "prudential standing rule" which generally bars plaintiffs
from advancing third person's legal interests (here, the ex-
cluded moderate and low income class) in order to obtain relief
for injury to themselves. Finding no relationship between the
taxpayers and the excluded class, other than an "incidental
congruity of interest,"' the Court found no justification for
departing from the general rule.
The Court also held that none of the petitioner housing and
building associations had standing. One association argued
that some of its members were Penfield residents deprived of
the benefits of living in an integrated community. Relying
again on its prudential standing rule, the Court held that it
would be inappropriate to permit the association to invoke the
judicial process by raising the rights of third parties (the ex-
cluded low and moderate income class) in order to redress harm
suffered by its own members. 8
The Court also found that the home builder associations
lacked standing. The association could not recover damages
because individualized proof would be necessary to establish
the injury suffered by the individual association's members
and an award could not go to the association itself. Further, the
Court found the home builder associations lacked standing to
obtain prospective injunctional and declaratory relief because
there were no allegations that any current projects were pre-
cluded by the ordinance or respondents' actions, such allega-
tions being necessary to show ripeness of the injury sufficient
to warrant judicial intervention.
84. Id. at 508 n. 18.
85. Id. at 510.
86. Id. at 511. The Court distinguished Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972) on the basis that the plaintiffs there were "persons aggrieved"
within the definition of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), and
were given the actionable right to be free from racially discriminatory practices in the
sale or rental of housing. 422 U.S. at 512.
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The Court's analysis suggests that Warth was simply a case
of poor pleading."7 However, it is more probable that the Court
intended to strictly curtail through the standing requirement
the groups and individuals who may challenge a community's
exclusionary policies." Both group and individual plaintiffs
must demonstrate in their pleadings that exclusionary prac-
tices have deprived them of specific opportunities to live in or
construct low and moderate income housing. Furthermore,
standing will always be questionable when the legal rights of
third parties are raised to invoke the aid of federal courts, and
hence it will be easier to acquire standing if the plaintiff's own
legal rights have been infringed.89
The formidable wall constructed in Warth was breached in
the recent case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,"° although the case is a source of
despair in other respects, discussed in detail below. In
Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court rejected a commmun-
ity's challenge to the standing of a nonprofit housing developer
where a low income project had been planned in detail and was
blocked only by a denial of the requested rezoning. The Court
dismissed the community's arguments that uncommitted fi-
nancing for the project rendered plaintiffs' claim too specula-
tive to form the personal stake in the controversy needed to
overcome the constitutional limitations on federal court juris-
diction. Furthermore, by joining as a plaintiff an individual
who was the subject of the alleged discrimination, plaintiffs
succeeded in acquiring the standing necessary to advance argu-
ments which would otherwise be those of third parties pre-
vented by the same prudential standing rule used to keep the
87. 422 U.S. at 508. Justice Douglas stated in dissent, "With all respect, I think
that the Court reads the complaint with antagonistic eyes." Id. at 518.
88. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, pointed out,
[T]he Court turns the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional scheme
into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation. In effect, the Court tells the
low-income minority and building company plaintiffs they will not be permitted
to prove what they have alleged - that they could and would build and live in
the town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its application -
because they have not succeeded in breaching, before the suit was filed, the very
barriers which are the subject of the suit.
Id. at 523.
89. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
90. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
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plaintiffs out of court in Warth.
In Arlington Heights, the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a local government's zon-
ing ordinance which had the "ultimate effect" of dispropor-
tionately excluding minorities violated the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
The Village of Arlington Heights, a northwest suburb of
Chicago, had sustained a great deal of population growth dur-
ing the period of 1960 to 1970. In the 1970 census the village
had a population of 64,000; however only 27 residents were
black.9' The evidence which had been developed at trial and
reviewed by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
indicated that the small number of blacks residing in Arlington
Heights stood in sharp contrast to the percentages of blacks
residing in the metropolitan area of Chicago. In fact, figures
from the most recent census revealed that the percentage of
blacks in Chicago had increased during 1960-1970 from 14 to
18 percent of the total population.2
The record also indicated that Arlington Heights had ini-
tially adopted a zoning ordinance which zoned the village lands
principally for single family detached housing. This zoning vir-
tually eliminated any opportunity for constructing low and
moderate income housing in the community.
In 1971 these zoning restrictions were called into question
when an Illinois nonprofit corporation seeking to construct
housing within the Village for lower income families had re-
quested that the Village rezone a parcel of land for multifamily
units. 3 That request for rezoning, however, was denied by the
local board of trustees on the grounds of preserving the integ-
rity of the zoning plan and protecting property values. 4
Subsequently, a decision was made to file a lawsuit chal-
lenging the denial of the request to rezone. 5 The additional and
91. Id. at 559.
92. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
93. The corporation was seeking to construct § 236 housing, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1
(Supp. IV 1974) which permits construction of housing at favorable interest rates. This
in turn would allow the owner to charge rents at a reduced level, thereby encouraging
low income renters.
94. 97 S. Ct. at 559.
95. The nonprofit corporation and three black individuals filed the lawsuit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Another nonprofit corporation and an individual of
Mexican-American descent intervened as plaintiffs. The individual black plaintiffs
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important facts which gave rise to this challenge and the issue
which was ultimately raised before the Supreme Court were
that the refusal to rezone the parcel of property affected a
distinct class of individuals who would have been eligible to
live in the low income housing and that forty percent of that
class was black.
The court of appeals, recognizing the possibility of racial
discrimination, felt compelled to analyze the Village's decision
not to rezone and assess it "not only in its immediate objective,
but its historical context and ultimate effect."9 The court of
appeals took judicial notice of the segregated racial housing in
Chicago and the fact that Arlington Heights had not sponsored
any low income housing development nor did it plan to do so.
The court found that because the Village had totally ignored
its responsibility in the past and that its present decision would
have the "ultimate effect" of perpetuating this trend, the gov-
ernmental decision was racially discriminatory and could only
be upheld if there was a compelling state interest to support
it. 97
The court also found that preserving the integrity of the
zoning plan and protecting property values did not meet the
stricter scrutiny of the compelling state interest test. The court
of appeals concluded therefore that the board's refusal to re-
zone violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. However, this decision was reversed and re-
manded on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 8
In reversing the court of appeals decision the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed its recent decision in Washington v.
Davis,9" holding that "official action will not be held unconsti-
tutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. 'Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
had sought certification of the action as a class action under FED. R. Cv. P. 23, but
the trial court had declined to certify. Id. at 560.
96. 517 F.2d at 413, citing Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436
F.2d 108, 112 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). See also U.S. v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (on title VIII, the Federal Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
97. 517 F.2d at 413. The suspect classification of race, here created by the zoning
ordinance and its subsequent decision not to rezone, gave rise to the court's invoking
the compelling state interest test.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 566. The case was remanded for further consideration of claims of
statutory violations.
99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." '"
Rather, the Court ruled it must be shown that the motivating
factor of the official action was racial discrimination.
In order to ascertain whether an action such as the Village's
denial to rezone was motivated by discriminatory purposes, it
would be necessary to conduct a broad inquiry of direct and
circumstantial evidence to determine the official intent. Most
importantly, this inquiry must be carried out by those persons
challenging the official action and its effects.
The Supreme Court noted that "the impact of the official
action - whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than an-
other' . . . may provide an important starting point . . . but
impact alone is not determinative.""0 ' Consequently, the Court
suggested other areas of inquiry which may shed light on
whether the official action was taken for invidious discrimina-
tory purposes. One was the historical background of the deci-
sion. Another was the sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision. And, a third was the legislative or admin-
istrative history, especially where that history contained state-
ments made by the decisionmakers, minutes of meetings or
reports.'0
In the circumstances of the Arlington Heights case the
United States Supreme Court could find no evidence that
showed improper discriminatory purposes had motivated the
village leaders in their decision to deny the rezoning. The offi-
cials had followed "usual procedures" and had adhered to a
zoning plan which had been developed years before the contro-
versy. The Supreme Court held therefore that the court of ap-
peals "finding that the Village's decision carried a discrimina-
tory 'ultimate effect' is without independent constitutional sig-
nificance."103
With the ruling in Arlington Heights the Supreme Court
has made it extremely difficult to change the status quo, even
though that may very well reinforce class distinctions based on
economic status and race.' 4 Those who now challenge the exist-
100. 97 S. Ct. at 563, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (1976).
101. 97 S. Ct. at 564 (citations omitted).
102. 97 S. Ct. at 565-66.
103. 97 S. Ct. at 566.
104. At one point the Court stated, "In many instances, to recognize the limited
probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the
'heterogeneity' of the nation's population." 97 S. Ct. at 564 n. 15.
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ence of segregated housing patterns must prove that the deci-
sionmakers who created the segregated housing in the first
place did so for racially discriminatory purposes. The Supreme
Court provides some "subjects of proper inquiry" to determine
such intent. But the Court itself admits that it may be a very
difficult burden to carry.
What the Court has done in the Arlington Heights ruling is
educate public officials on how to establish a defensible exclu-
sionary zoning program. As long as the local officials follow
their usual procedures and refrain from making crude public
statements against permitting minorities within the com-
munity, no clear intent will be found. Furthermore, under the
less stringent standards, there need not be an explanation of a
compelling nature by the local officials of why the community
is pursuing a segregationist policy. In sum, Arlington Heights
says that local communities may continue to tell certain classes
and groups of people that they are not wanted so long as this
message is communicated through the language of zoning laws.
C. Summary of Case Law
The above cases demonstrate the difficulty of striking an
equitable balance between local government and regional
needs. The local governments justify their exclusionary prac-
tices as legitimate means of furthering the general health,
safety and welfare of their citizens. Individuals challenging
these practices claim that general welfare can only be furthered
by taking into account regional needs.
The Village of Belle Terre and City of Eastlake cases uphold
the traditionally sanctioned broad discretion afforded to local
governments in controlling land use even where the effect of
such control keeps certain segments of society from residing in
the community.
Warth v. Seldin has made it more difficult to gain access
to the federal courts to litigate the constitutional questions
which surround zoning ordinances that effectuate wealth dis-
crimination. With the most recent decision of Arlington
Heights, it is not enough that official action -such as zoning has
resulted in a disproportionate effect upon minorities; a chal-
lenge on exclusionary grounds will now be successful only if the
practice is tied to a violation of federal statutes as in City of
Hartford v. Hills or blatant discriminatory actions, such as in
Gautreaux. Perhaps this is best exemplified in the Petaluma
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decision where the court was fully cognizant of the arguments
of meeting regional needs but, in dictum, responded by saying
that only the state legislatures can require local governments
to assume these burdens.
In short, the reasoning found in many of the recent federal
decisions which sustains exclusionary practices is reminiscent
of the late nineteenth century philosophy which produced
Plessy v. Ferguson,10 5 although the techniques employed are
more subtle. On the other hand, several decisions within the
state courts indicate a more favorable disposition to granting
broad relief from exclusionary practices.
The Town of Willistown case in Pennsylvania and the New
Jersey decisions of Mount Laurel and Oakwood at Madison
provide clear statements by the highest courts of those states
that exclusionary zoning will not be countenanced. Under these
opinions local units of government must now assume the re-
sponsibility of accommodating their fair share of low and mod-
erate income housing to satisfy present and prospective re-
gional needs. Similarly, the New York decision in Berenson v.
Town of New Castle recognized that local governments must
consider the effect of their zoning ordinances on neighboring
communities and that municipalities must balance their desire
for maintaining the local status quo with the broader public
interests of the greater region. Significantly, in all of these
decisions the state courts were able to find sufficient authority
under their own laws and constitutions to strike down exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances. This fact, coupled with the cold
reception given by federal courts to these types of claims sug-
gests that plaintiffs will be more successful if they base their
claims on state law.106
IV. ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet faced the issue
of whether exclusionary practices are legal under state or fed-
eral law. There is some basis in Wisconsin case law for arguing
that such practices are illegal, 0 but there is no assurance that
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
106. Justice Brennan has recently suggested this strategy. Brennan, State Consti-
tutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
107. In Town of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958), the court
struck down an ordinance which arbitrarily zoned an entire town residential when the
town area in its entirety was not adaptable to residential use. It declared,
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the Wisconsin court would follow the path of the Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and New York courts. Certainly, it is possible for
The purpose of zoning is to set aside areas for specific uses and to protect
them from encroachments in the form of other uses inconsistent with the uses
to which they are dedicated. In making the classifications necessary to facilitate
that purpose, the municipality must recognize the natural reasons and differ-
ences suggested by necessity and circumstances existing in the area with which
the ordinance deals.
Id. at 189, 87 N.W.2d at 872 [citations omitted]. While the reference here to "areas"
is to zoning districts, the Wisconsin court could, by analogy, recognize that conditions
outside a district or even a local jurisdiction could necessitate different uses even
within a district, e.g., multifamily housing units interspersed with single family resi-
dences.
The Hobart case is of further importance to the issue of exclusionary zoning because
the court reiterates the standards for classifying zoning districts found in Ford Hopkins
Co. v. Mayor, 226 Wis. 215, 222, 276 N.W. 311, 314 (1937):
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions which
make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each mem-
ber thereof.
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far different from
those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having
regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation.
The most important of these standards is the third, that which negates existing
circumstances as the sole basis for classification. This standard could arguably be
raised against a community which attempts to preserve the status quo and preclude
low and moderate income housing.
In another case, Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees,
12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961), the court dealt with a village ordinance which
attempted to exclude churches from particular districts. While this decision is based
upon the constitutional protection of freedom of religion, there is in the concurring
opinion of Justice Hallows some reasoning which pehaps could have ramifications on
the constitutionality of ordinances which exclude low and moderate income residences.
Justice Hallows stated,
The various factors considered in excluding churches from a residential area or
in determining the priority of granting or refusing a permit under those types
of ordinances which permit churches in an area only by permit have been the
subject matter of numerous cases. These factors, including traffic problems,
traffic conditions, and effect of depreciating property values, loss of tax revenue,
noise and other inconveniences, and that churches are detrimental and do not
further public morals, have been considered and rejected. ...
...Churches are not supermarkets, manufacturing-plants, or commercial
establishments and should not be restricted to such areas. How can the exclu-
sion of churches from a residential area promote public morals or the general
welfare?"
Id. at 608-09, 108 N.W.2d 300-01. For the purposes of the discussion here, one might
ask how the exclusion of low and moderate housing from a residential area promotes
the general welfare, unless of course "general welfare" only refers to that of the rich.
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the Wisconsin court to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution'8
and statutory law'09 as precluding the exclusion of low and
moderate income residential units by local governments."10
Assuming that exclusionary practices were found to be ille-
gal, the selection of a remedy from among the many alterna-
tives would be no easy matter. The Wisconsin court could
strike down the ordinances in question and indirectly affect
local zoning ordinances in other parts of the state; it could take
notice of regional problems and order relief based on a formula
which designates the appropriate region and housing market
area and allocate a fair share of housing for each municipality;
it could require certain revisions in the specific ordinance
under challenge, as was done in the New Jersey decision of
Oakwood at Madison, and approach the problem on a case by
case basis; it could call upon planning experts or planning
agencies to develop appropriate remedies for specific areas; or,
it could take a narrower approach, finding that particular land
use regulations are unconstitutional in their application to spe-
cific land parcels and order the parcel rezoned for a low or
moderate income housing project. However, fashioning narrow
relief would make unified housing planning difficult by creat-
ing new enclaves of low income and/or minority groups. Alter-
natively, the Wisconsin Supreme Court might adopt a mixture
of these remedies, or choose to ignore the problem altogether,
thereby forcing the issue into other forums."'
Nonjudicial approaches should also be considered for deal-
ing with the problem of exclusionary practices in southeastern
Wisconsin. Some potential solutions to this complicated prob-
lem may rest in administrative agency action or legislation.
The Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, 112
for example, has developed a regional housing plan designed to
meet the region's unique characteristics. It requires a strong
intergovernmental commitment to plan and provide for a wide
range of housing structures with a view toward meeting re-
108. See note 41 supra.
109. See note 1 supra.
110. See also 59 Marq. L. Rev. 211, 223-24 (1976).
ill. For further discussion of legal remedies see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, __ N.J. -, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Mytelka & Mytelka,
Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1, 18-32
(1975).
112. See note 6 supra.
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gional needs. The Wisconsin Legislature, in addition, may re-
quire that local units of government provide adequate housing
* for all income levels. Other states, most notably Massachu-
setts, require by legislative mandate that local units of govern-
ment provide a certain percentage of their residential develop-
ment for low and moderate income households. Some of these
alternatives are considered below. 112.1
A. A Regional Housing Plan for Southeastern Wisconsin
A word of caution is due whenever comprehensive planning
on a regional basis is considered. The unique characteristics
present at the local level must always be accounted for if plan-
ning is to be efficient and successful. The failure to take these
characteristics into account may, in fact, compound the prob-
lem. 3
After making a thorough study of the housing problems in
the southeastern region of Wisconsin, SEWRPC has developed
a series of alternative plans and strategies designed to meet the
housing needs of the region."' These plans and strategies may
be broken down into two broad categories: those which call for
subsidized housing and those which do not."5
1. Non-Subsidy Recommendations
The SEWRPC plan recognizes that in southeastern Wiscon-
112.1. See text accompanying notes 137-46, infra.
113. See, e.g., Burchell, Listokin, and James, Exclusionary Zoning Pitfalls of the
Regional Remedy, 7 URB. LAW. 262 (1975).
114. PLANNING REPORT No. 20, supra note 15, at 7. It should be pointed out that
the objectives of this report are not only to provide adequate housing for low and
moderate income households using specific spatial allocation strategies, "but also to
promote the development of a full range of housing costs, types, and styles in the best
possible living environment by directing the development of housing to well-serviced
locations. The study is thus intended to promote orderly, efficient, areawide develop-
ment while discouraging premature development and the location of housing in areas
poorly suited to residential use." Id.
To recall, 96,000, or 18 percent, of the households in the region were found to be in
housing need in 1970. Of this total, 69,000, or 13 percent, were found to be in economic
need. These households occupy decent, safe, and sanitary housing but must pay a
disproportionate share of their income to do so. The remainder, 26,500 households,
were found to occupy housing which was physically deficient. But SEWRPC estimates
that if more effective utilization was made of presently overcrowded but otherwise
sound housing, only 17,800 would be needed to eliminate the physical housing need.
See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
115. SEWRPC recognized that there is a strong relationship between these two




sin, economic, institutional and social obstacles prohibit the
development of adequate housing for the poor. The economic
constraints result from the high cost of houses built on fully
improved lots. ' Although residential housing suppliers can be
encouraged to use cost saving innovations in construction, fi-
nancing and marketing, the costs of producing homes can not
be lowered appreciably.
Institutional obstacles hindering adequate housing include
the existing property tax structure and local land use controls.
A cost-revenue study made by SEWRPC found that the exclu-
sion of moderately priced homes in order to protect the local
tax base was not justified."7 However, the cost-revenue study
did indicate that educational costs incurred by areas with mod-
erately priced housing may indeed constitute an undue burden
on the local fiscal structure, depending on the size of the school
age population generated by such housing."' To counter the
property tax problem of low income housing, the plan recom-
mends changing the method of generating funds from a prop-
erty tax to some other form of tax.1 '9 Land use controls are also
significant institutional constraints in meeting housing needs,
as the foregoing discussion of the present regional residential
trends and the case law indicate.
The SEWRPC plan recommends amending zoning ordi-
nances, building codes, and subdivision controls. The plan sug-
gests that each community incorporate a zoning provision for
a full range of housing sizes - single family, two family, and
116. SEWRPC estimates that in 1972 the production cost of a new, conventionally
built house on a fully improved city lot was $35,060. The costs were distributed as
follows: on-site labor - $6,000, or 17 percent; materials - $13,000, or 37 percent; fully
improved lot - $9,100, or 26 percent; overhead and profits - $6,000, or 17 percent;
and construction financing - $960, or 3 percent. PLANNING REPORT No. 20, supra note
15, at 423.
117. On the average, for all civil divisions included in the study the tax levy for
municipal purposes on a $25,000 house was only $8 per year less than the per household
cost of providing municipal sewers. Id. at 424.
118. Id.
119. Another problem created by the present reliance on the property tax as the
major source of revenue was also recognized in the rehabilitation of substandard
homes. A rehabilitated home would normally be assessed at a higher value and this,
coupled with the cost of rehabilitation, would place the home out of reach of many low
and moderate income households. SEWRPC recommends, therefore, that local govern-
ments take advantage of Wis. STAT. § 70.11(24)(c) (1975) which exempts these physical
improvements for five years, the maximum exclusion being $1,000, or 10 percent of the
value of the improved property.
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multifamily. Zoning ordinances should indicate a full range of
lot sizes, such as districts containing lot sizes of 7,200 square
feet or less for single family detached housing and 8,000 square
feet or less for two family structures. Districts should be estab-
lished with minimum floor area requirements that approxi-
mate the standards for decent housing developed by
SEWRPC.' 21 Furthermore, to reduce the costs associated with
improvements, such as curbs, paved streets, and sanitary sewer
mains, it is suggested that planned unit development tech-
niques be employed to allow for more intensive development
while still preserving an overall net density. 12' The effect of this
later strategy would be to diminish the service requirement and
costs associated with sprawling lots.12
As to building codes, the major cost center was identified
as the differences between community building codes in regu-
lating materials, equipment, and methods. It was felt that the
nonuniformity unnecessarily added to the complexity of com-
pliance. Thus, it was proposed that local governments adopt
the Wisconsin Uniform Building Code which regulates one and
two family residential structures."
With respect to local subdivision control ordinances, it was
determined that the improvements frequently required of a
developer as a condition to subdivision are often excessively
stringent. These costs are invariably passed on by the devel-
oper thereby placing the housing out of the affordable range of
many individuals. Thus, it was recommended by SEWRPC
that communities adopt more realistic requirements.'2
Finally, SEWRPC also made recommendations for the
abatement of social constraints. To counteract community
opposition which is based on noneconomic factors, it was sug-
gested that federal, state and local fair housing laws which
prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of race, creed, and
120. See note 21, supra.
121. Planned unit development districts permit, with proper planning, the location
of all living phases in a designated area, rather than the frequently found segregation
of commercial, residential and recreational uses. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 62.23(7)(b) (1975).
122. See SoUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, MODEL ZONING
ORDINANCE, PLANNING GUIDE No. 3 (1965), which provides suggestions for the use of
such techniques.
123. PLANNING REPORT No. 20, supra note 15, at 425.
124. SEWRPC suggested those found in SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLAN-
NING COMMISSION, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE, PLANNING GUIDE No. 1 (1963).
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national origin be expanded to prohibit discrimination in the
sale, rental or financing of housing on the basis of sex, marital
status, source of income, and family size; '25 that developers of
low income housing locate and construct such housing in a
manner which physically integrates the units into the neigh-
borhood to the maximum extent possible; and to further
counter the communities' social constraints, it was proposed
that a state housing appeals board be created that could, upon
review, issue a permit for low and moderate income housing
over the objections of local communities. This latter mecha-
nism is similar in certain aspects to the legislatively mandated
appeals board in Massachusetts which will be analyzed
below.'26
2. Subsidy Recommendations
The above recommendations deal only with the nonsubsidy
recommendations of SEWRPC's regional plan. However, the
use of subsidized housing would doubtlessly effectuate the
greatest changes and do so within a shorter period of time.
The subsidized housing plans employ a two-tiered ap-
proach. The first involves the selection of plans for the physical
placement of housing units in the region (housing locational
strategies). The second involves the priority by which the sub-
sidized housing will be constructed according to the housing
location plan chosen. It was necessary to resort to a priority
schedule due to the limited amount of funding expected to be
available.
SEWRPC devised three strategies by which the spatial dis-
tribution of subsidized housing might be provided: (a) an exist-
ing need strategy, (b) a dispersal strategy, and (c) a composite
factor strategy. All three strategies are concerned with the
problem of overcoming an identified physical housing need in
the region. Physical need is determined by those households
which presently occupy substandard and overcrowded housing.
125. Wis. STAT. §§ 66.432 and 101.22 (1975).
126. SEWRPC suggested criteria that could be used in reviewing a community's
denial of low income housing: the existing need for, or shortage of, low and moderate
income housing in the area; employment opportunities; transportation facilities; avail-
ability of necessary public services and facilities; and the fiscal capability of the area
to absorb such housing in terms of levels of personal income and property values.
Under this plan determinations made by an appeals board would be subject to judicial
review. PLANNING REPORT No. 20, supra note 15, at 427.
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It is estimated there is a physical housing need of 17,800 units
in the region.'2
The existing need strategy would allocate housing according
to the present expressed need in the region. This strategy,
therefore, would concentrate the housing units in the region's
older urban centers. It would perpetuate and reinforce the ex-
isting geographical distribution of low and moderate income
households.
The exact opposite strategy, the dispersal strategy, would
allocate housing to areas where the lowest incidence of housing
need presently exists. Under this alternative the suburban and
outlying rural areas of the region would receive the subsidized
housing.
The last strategy, the composite factor strategy, represents
a middle position between the first two. It relies on three indi-
cators for the distribution ratio of the housing units. The first
indicator is the existing need in the area for publicly assisted
housing. 28 The second indicator, and the most critical one, is
the area's suitability for the housing. Particular emphasis is
placed upon land availability, employment opportunities,
availability of mass transit, and fiscal suitability. The third
indicator is the past performance of the area in providing such
housing. In this respect, the ratio of the allocation decreases as
the percentage of subsidized housing presently existing in-
creases. These three alternative housing locational strategies
are compared in Figure 11.
As part of its regional housing plan, SEWRPC has adopted
the composite factor allocation strategy for the geographical
distribution of subsidized housing. However, in recognition of
the fact that not enough public monies are now available to
subsidize the needed housing, SEWRPC developed a schedule
of priorities for disposing of the housing subsidy funds. For
those programs involving rehabilitation of substandard hous-
ing, SEWRPC recommended expending the greatest effort in
the large central cities of the region where large concentrations
of substandard housing currently exist. It was felt that by reha-
bilitating many of these existing homes, it would not only add
127. See note 17 supra for further explanation of how this figure was obtained.
128. Using this indicator, the number of units allocated would be distributed pri-
marily to the large central cities. The effect is very similar to that of the first strategy,
and for that reason it would perpetuate many existing trends.
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an equivalent number of units to the stock of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing, but would also arrest the cycle of neighbor-
hood deterioration which creates additional substandard hous-
ing. 2 1 In those programs which subsidize new housing construc-
tion, the designated priority areas were determined by employ-
ment opportunities and developable land. If implemented, this
priority for constructing new low and moderate income housing
would result in dispersing the new dwellings throughout the
suburban and outlying areas of the region (see Figure 12) ."'
The vehicle which SEWRPC felt was the most logical entity
to analyze local housing needs and to administer programs for
the abatement of the identified problems was a county housing
agency. Wisconsin Statute section 59.075 grants to a county
housing authority the powers to prepare, carry out, acquire,
lease, and operate housing projects; to arrange or contract for
the furnishing of services, privileges, works, or facilities; to
lease or rent any dwellings; to acquire by eminent domain any
real property; to own, hold, clear, and improve property.1 31 The
county housing authority may exercise these powers in all unin-
corporated parts of the county and may undertake housing
projects within the boundaries of cities or villages if a resolu-
tion has been adopted by the municipality permitting the
county to exercise its authority within its jurisdiction. 32
SEWRPC's regional housing plan offers several possible sol-
utions to residential exclusionary practices. However, state law
does not require local communities to adopt any of SEWRPC's
recommendations. Given the severity of the problem and as-
suming continued local community intransigence, legislative
action would be most appropriate.
129. PLANNING REPORT No. 20, supra note 15, at 428.
130. A third priority area for programs involving utilization of the existing stock
of standard housing was identified. Programs of this type usually involve direct or
indirect subsidies to the households themselves so that they would then be able to
compete in the marketplace. As pointed out by SEWRPC, the problem is that this
form of direct subsidy may create inflationary pressures on sale prices and rents in the
area. Therefore, it was recommended that administrators of such programs give prior-
ity to applications which offer evidence of sufficient vacancy rates for housing of the
type and price range desired by eligible applicants: 1.5 percent for homeowner housing,
and 5 percent for rental housing. Id. at 431.
131. These and other enumerated powers are provided to cities and villages under
Wis. STAT. §§ 66.40-66.404 (1975). Counties have these powers by legislative reference.
Wis. STAT. § 59.075 (1975).
132. Wis. STAT. § 59.075(3) (1975).
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B. Legislative Action Against Exclusionary Zoning
1. Existing Wisconsin Legislation Dealing With the Problems
of Low and Moderate Income Housing and Discrimination
As early as 1939, the Wisconsin Legislature found,
[T]here exist in the State insanitary or unsafe dwelling ac-
commodations and that persons of low income are forced to
reside in such insanitary or unsafe accommodations; that
within the state there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling
accommodations available at rents which persons of low in-
come can afford and that such persons are forced to occupy
overcrowded and congested dwelling accommodations; that
the aforesaid conditions cause an increase in and spread of
disease and crime and constitute a menace to the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state and
impair economic values; that these conditions necessitate
excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds
for crime prevention and punishment, public health and
safety, fire and accident protection, and other public services
and facilities .... 133
Moreover, under the Wisconsin Bill of Human Rights, the Leg-
islature has provided that any municipality, including counties
and school boards, may form or join in the formation of com-
munity relations-social development commissions.34 One of
the main functions of the commissions would be to recommend
solutions to the problem of discrimination in housing and to
conduct studies on the "inciting or fomenting of class, race, or
religious hatred and prejudice."' 35
Furthermore, under the fair housing statute of Wisconsin,
the Legislature set forth the following policy:
It is the intent of this section to render unlawful discrimina-
tion in housing. It is the declared policy of this State that all
persons shall have an equal opportunity for housing regard-
less of sex, race, color, physical condition, developmental dis-
ability..., religion, national origin, or ancestry and it is the
duty of the local units of government to assist in the orderly
prevention or removal of all discrimination in housing
through the powers granted under s. 66.433.... This section
133. Wis. STAT. § 66.40(2) (1939), currently appearing at Wis. STAT. § 66.40(2)
(1975).
134. Wis. STAT. § 66.433(1)-(2) (1975).
135. Wis. STAT. § 66.433(3)(b)-(c) (1975).
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shall be deemed an exercise of the police powers of the State
for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, dignity, and
human rights of the people of this State.' 6
It is clear from the above statutory enactments that the
State legislature has been aware of the housing problems in
Wisconsin for several decades. In particular, it has been aware
of the problems which beset low and moderate income families.
However, it has not placed the state affirmatively behind the
provision of low income housing by mandating their inclusion
within local communities, even though the problems that it
cites in earlier legislation continue to mount. Legislation which
mandates the opening up of local communities to accommo-
date low and moderate income households is long overdue.
Some precedent already exists in other states for this approach.
2. The Massachusetts Experience
In the late 1960s the Massachusetts Legislature commis-
sioned a study to be conducted on exclusionary zoning by local
governments.'37 That report surveyed 113 selected towns in the
commonwealth to analyze the use of zoning powers by local
governments to ascertain whether restrictions were placed on
residential development for lower income groups. The report
found a substantial use of large lot zoning involving thirty per-
cent or more of the local territory in at least 21 towns of those
surveyed, almost all of which were suburban.' 8 As a result of
this study, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted into law the
Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, more commonly
known as the Anti-snob Zoning Act.' 31 The Massachusetts
Anti-snob Zoning statute enables any public agency, nonprofit
or limited dividend organization which has had a proposal to
build low or moderate income housing denied by a local zoning
board of appeals, to obtain review of that decision by a State
Housing Appeals Committee.'4 ° The same review procedure is
available if certain prohibited conditions are placed on the
136. Wis. STAT. § 101.22 (1975). The legislature has also recognized the need for
housing for the elderly. See Wis. STAT. § 66.395 (1975).
137. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REPORT
RELATIVE TO RESTRICTING THE ZONING POWER TO CITY AND COUNTY GOVERNMENTS, SENATE
No. 1133 (June 1968).
138. Id. at 98.
139. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West Supp. 1976).
140. Id. § 22.
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approval of the proposal. The law establishes a Housing Ap-
peals Committee within the Massachusetts State Department
of Community Affairs.
When a review of the decision is sought, the Housing Ap-
peals Committee holds a hearing to determine,
(a) In the case of a denial of application, whether the deci-
sion of the local Board of Appeals was reasonable and consis-
tent with local needs; or
(b) In the case of approval of an application with condi-
tions, whether such conditions and requirements make the
construction or operation of such housing uneconomic' and
whether they are consistent with local needs.'
Of greatest importance is the provision of the Act which
states that in order to be consistent with local needs, there
must exist within each community enough low and moderate
income housing to exceed ten percent of the total number of
housing units reported in the latest decennial census. In the
alternative, the amount of low and moderate income housing
present in a community must exceed a certain percentage of
the local land base in the community.'
If the Housing Appeals Committee finds that the decision
141. The Act provides,
Requirements or regulations shall be consistent with local needs when imposed
'by a board of zoning appeals after [it has conducted a] comprehensive hearing
in a city or town where (1) low or moderate income housing exists which is in
excess of ten per cent of the housing units reported in the latest decennial census
of the city or town or on sites comprising one and one half percent or more of
the total land area zoned for residential, commercial or industrial use or (2) the
application before the board would result in the commencement of construction
of such housing on sites comprising more than three tenths of one per cent of
such land area or ten acres, whichever is larger, in any one calendar year. ...
Id. § 20.
142. "Uneconomic" is defined in the Act to mean,
[Any condition brought about by any single factor or combination of factors
to the extent that it makes it impossible for a public agency or nonprofit organi-
zation to proceed in building or operating low or moderate income housing
without financial loss, or for a limited dividend organization to proceed and still
realize a reasonable return in building or operating such housing within the
limitations set by the subsidizing agency of government on the size or character
of the development or on the amount or nature of the subsidy or on the tenants,
rentals and income permissible, and without substantially changing the rent
levels and unit sizes proposed by the public, nonprofit or limited dividend
organizations.
Id. § 20.
143. Id. § 23.
144. Id. See note 98 supra.
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of the board to deny an application was unreasonable and not
consistent with local needs, it shall vacate the decision and
direct the board to issue a comprehensive permit of approval
to the applicant.'4 5 If the Committee determines in the case of
approval with conditions that those conditions are uneconomic
and not consistent with local needs, it will order the board to
modify or remove the conditions in order to make the project
economical.'46
Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals
Committee'47 was the first constitutional challenge to the Act
to reach the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. There,
the court sustained the Legislature's enactment, which su-
perseded local land use regulations for the purpose of promot-
ing the development of low and moderate income housing, find-
ing that it was "a constitutionally valid exercise of the Legisla-
ture's zoning power . ... 148 In a subsequent decision,
Mahoney v. Board of Appeals of Winchester,'49 the Supreme
Judicial Court reaffirmed its position in Hanover. The court
ruled that the delegation of this authority to the Housing Ap-
peals Committee was proper and that the exercise of that au-
thorization and the necessity of providing low and moderate
income housing in this statutory manner did not constitute
spot zoning.'50
The Anti-snob Zoning Act, however, has not met with wide-
spread success. Due to local intransigence, and a variety of
procedural delays, local governments have been successful in
preventing the construction of large numbers of housing units
under the provisions of the Act."' The result is that many
145. Id. § 23.
146. Id. However, the Committee is barred from ordering the removal of a condition
that would make the project unsafe under site plan requirements of either the Federal
Housing Administration or the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, whichever is
financially assisting the project. See note 99 supra.
147. 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973).
148. Id. at -, 294 N.E.2d at 424.
149. 74 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1419, 316 N.E.2d 606 (1974).
150. Spot zoning exists where a single lot or area is granted privileges which are
not granted or extended to other lands in the vicinity and in the same use district. See
Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 294
N.E.2d 393 (1973).
151. As of late 1975, 27 decisions have been made by the Housing Appeals Commit-
tee; in 21 instances, local decisions were overruled and comprehensive permits granted.
These decisions have involved 3,756 units for low and moderate income housing. How-
ever, only 216 units are completed and ready for occupancy, 1,553 are in the planning
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potential developers, especially the private ones, see the possi-
bility of large sums of money being tied up over an extended
period of time which they can ill afford. At this time, therefore,
there is a great hesitancy on their part to pursue projects for
low and moderate income housing.
3. The New York Experience
Another state which took some affirmative action towards
meeting the housing needs of low and moderate income house-
holds is New York. That state, however, has since backed away
from its originally strong position.
The approach that New York took was to form a State
Urban Development Corporation, granting it the authority to
construct or rehabilitate housing for persons and families of low
income.'5 2 If the Corporation found that a need for such housing
did exist in a particular locality and that private enterprise
could not meet that need, then the Corporation was authorized
to do so through its own projects. Moreover, if the Corporation
determined that it could not comply with local ordinances and
regulations, it was authorized to override them. In the ensuing
years, this authority was challenged as being a violation of
home rule powers, but it was upheld on several occasions.'5 3
However, in 1973 the New York Legislature amended the
original grant of authority to the Corporation.'54 The amend-
ment prohibits approval of a residential project in a town or
incorporated village as long as formal objections by the local
government have been submitted to the Corporation. The
amendment does not require the local unit of government to
offer any justification for its objections, thereby permitting the
stage with no definite construction date, and well over half - 1,987 - the units are
tied up in the appeal process of the courts. Information supplied in a letter to the
author from Mr. Maurice Corman, Chief Counsel, Massachusetts Department of Com-
munity Affairs (October 21, 1975).
152. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6251-85. The legislation was enacted pursuant to N.Y.
CONST. art. 18, § 1.
153. See Floyd v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 395,
343 N.Y.S.2d 493, aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 1, 300 N.E.2d 704, 347 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1973); Peters
v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 1008, 344 N.Y.S.2d 151
(1973). In the latter case it was found that the Corporation was not limited to acting
in blighted areas. In this instance it was acting in an area zoned for the highest
residential use. The court found the Corporation was exempt from local ordinances
since it was performing a governmental, rather than proprietary, function.
154. N.Y. LAws ch. 446, § 3 (1973) amended UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6265.
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local communities to exclude housing for low income persons
and families. In this respect, the New York legislation now
resembles that of Wisconsin's County Housing Authority which
may not undertake any project within a village or city without
its permission, no matter how justified it may be. '55 Presently,
therefore, the New York and Wisconsin legislation clearly lack
the remedial strength of the Massachusetts Anti-snob Zoning
enactment.
4. A Proposal for Wisconsin Legislation
If the local governments of southeastern Wisconsin persist
in excluding low and moderate income households from their
midst, the Wisconsin Legislature should act on behalf of the
general welfare of its citizens. Legislation should be enacted
that will require local communities to consider regional and
statewide needs for the housing of low and moderate income
individuals. It could achieve this objective through a variety of
methods. One would be to require that all local units of govern-
ment adopt and adhere to the housing plans developed by their
respective regional planning commissions. In the event that a
regional housing plan does not exist, a plan could be developed
for the area by a designated state agency. Another possibility
which would permit greater local flexibility would be to incor-
porate some aspects of the Massachusetts Low and Moderate
Income Housing Act dealing with the administrative and judi-
cial state review processes. However, it would be desirable to
adopt the Act with the following modifications:
(a) Local communities should be required to establish
plans which set forth the location and timing of development
of the low and moderate income housing within certain pre-
scribed state or regional standards and which must be accom-
plished within prescribed time periods.
(b) A requirement that police powers (including zoning
and subdivision control ordinances) be exercised in conformity
with the local plan.
155. Wis. STAT. § 59.075 (1975). Wisconsin law also provides that two or more
municipalities may act jointly to control or operate housing for low and moderate
income households. Wis. STAT. §§ 66.40 et seq. (1975). Also, the Department of Local
Affairs and Development is permitted to make loans to sponsors of low and moderate
income housing projects, but only if "the secretary may reasonably anticipate that a
federally aided mortgage or grant may be obtained for permanent financing of the
project." Wis. STAT. § 22.13(3)(b) (1975).
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(c) Actual plans developed by a local community should
be made subject to state or regional review to ensure compli-
ance with the state or regional standards, and to
(1) Ensure that the most undesirable locations are not cho-
sen;
(2) Require that the local plans provide a mixing of low and
moderate income housing throughout its various residential
zones so as to preclude enclaves consisting solely of low and
moderate income individuals; and
(3) Interrelate the local plans with other state, regional, and
local plans to ensure the provision of basic services, such as
public transportation, schools, open spaces, employment,
and health facilities, in order to provide a viable setting for
the residences.
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the communities which ring the major urban cen-
ters in the southeastern region of Wisconsin are excluding pro-
spective households on the basis of wealth. While many of
these communities claim that they are attempting to further
the health, safety and general welfare of their citizens, in many
instances the use of these exclusionary practices has its source
in parochial and narrow minded interests. The result is that
members of low and moderate income households are fore-
closed from looking outside of the urban centers in choosing a
residence.
This article has explored some of the alternatives available
for challenging exclusionary practices. Where their legality has
been challenged, decisions have been rendered both for and
against a community's right to indirectly shut off certain
groups from their midst. As a result of some federal decisions,
challengers might be advised to pursue their attacks in state
courts under state law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court as of
this date has not had the opportunity to address the issue.
A second alternative is the use of regional planning commis-
sions. In its regional plan, SEWRPC offers possible solutions
to the present housing needs of the citizens of the region. The
strategies it has formulated are designed specifically for the
region, taking into account many of its unique characteristics.
However, the plans that it proposes do not have the force of law
and therefore need not be adopted by the local units of govern-
ment of the southeastern region of Wisconsin.
If the local communities persist in their exclusionary prac-
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tices, the Wisconsin Legislature should act. If it does, it could
require that local units of government in the southeastern re-
gion, as well as those throughout the state, affirmatively act to
eliminate current residential exclusionary practices. Clearly, if
the ever tightening ring around Wisconsin's major cities is not
lifted, a significant portion of the state's residents will be de-
prived of sharing in the benefits of new growth and confined to
the deteriorating urban centers of the state. Moreover, the
demarcation of classes within society will become even more
pronounced.
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anoae Ceet pe dsceShn unit
dL,_ fhn 1 percet
Source: SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN FOR
SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN, PLANNING REPORT No. 20, at 220 (1975).FIGURE 8
COMMUNITIES IN THE REGION
WHICH RESTRICT THE PROVISION
OF MODEST-SIZED. SINGLE-FAMILY
HOUSING BASED ON MINIMUM FLOOR
AREA STANDARDS: 1971
LEGOEND Em-
Modest-sized, too-bedroom sngle-family units are pecluded in 64 of the 87 urban communltes to the Region, based on adopted minimum
floor area slandaed. Communities which are considered to restrict provision of modestsaed two-bedroow units are concentrated in Waukesha
Coonty. here 22 of 25 urban communities. or 88 percent. exceed recommended minimum floor area standards; and Ozaukee County, where
six of eight urban communities, or 75 percent. exceed the standard Provision of modest-sized three and four-bedroom un$ts i restricted by
flo r area requirements most often in these same two counties.
Source: SoTHEAsTERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION. A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN FOR
Soumra.sTEaR WISCONSIN, PLANNING REPORT No. 20. at 227 (1975).
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FIGURE 9
COMMUNITIES IN THE RE0"1N
WHICH SEVERELY RESTRICT This-
PROVISION OF MODES'I-SIZED
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING BASED, 'C
ADJUSTED MINIMUM FLOOR ARFA STIAr h)DS
1971
LEOE'Ni2
[- G . .
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Provisotn of rnod'.st-srnuR mltifamily houing is coosdred to be wereiv restvidted by floe. area requireiuent vhirch exceed adiusted star
dard in 59 of the 61 uran cornmunitl-s Sn the Region for effcdenny unts, ro66 co ,mrntie$ for onebedroom units. in 42 coimunis for
swo-Iredroonm unts, ar d in 26 communities for three-bedroom units A total of 16 of the 87 urban commuont preclude rultifamily housing
alto ether. odnrt.sized efficiency or coe-bedroom units are precluded i seven of eight urban communitin (ftaukee County. in eight of
11 urban communities in Racine County. and in 18 of 25 urban rommunitiesn M huknsha County.
Source: SourcsrERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNNG CoMMIssION, A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN FOR
SoUTHEASTER WISCONSIN, PLANNING Rpoir No. 20, at 233 (1975).
FIGURE 10
NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF SECTION 235 HOUSING UNITS
IN THE REGION BY COUNTY: JUNE 1973
Sectuon 235 Housing Units
Existing 1 Nen Total
Pacent of 1 Percent of 1 Percent o1
County Nttmber Units in Region Number Units in I egion Noiber in Region
Keroia .. . 43 2.3 625 16.8 663 12.0
tilaulien . . . 1367 74.2 1.622 43.6 2.9S9 53.8
Ozaukee .... - • 28 .8 23 0.5
Raine .... 418 22.7 820 22.1 1.233 2Z3
)Valotnth . . . 1 .1 53 1.4 64 1.0
Wahington.. . 3 0.2 23a 6.4 241 4.3
Waukirs . . . 10 0.5 330 8.9 340 6.1
Region J 1.8 4 2  1 100.0 ] 3,716 100.0 5,553 100.0
Source: Soo23srERN WISCONSIN REGIONAL PLANNING COm7GmON, A REGIONAL HOUSING PLAN FOR
SoUrREASTERN WSCONSIN, PLANNING REPORT No. 20, at 250 (1975).
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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
COWARION Of THE ALLOCATION OF
MSSUCLY SUBSIDS2dD ,OUSING UNITS
iN tHE REGION URD9N TfHE 0i,*37Mg9




The exislimig need W rnny allocates elnaost 74 perent of the 1l.840 tots? u. needed to lb. Cities of MWltkeeo Rcine. Snd K.esfus. While
enoch of the tiotieig nee m ay be ;totd in be, uban are. this strateg no t y retrictl the lotaional Chaie of howIeholds. The
d. .trtry. wn the other h4. eltocatt molt units to the sturben and outltng tonattbkn fringe bounst nalysis aitea. The cornposite
$wenn tus"n? rtetm" tr ecognize ah etae's heusing ne. its abiity to absorb addinal publicly assisted homing units. tad its put efforts
in nmmenit le h"oe1.4 ts of te and¢d stctnlec howot eoW in itt me, erl th reby provide a more balanced disiribuion of units,
tlbaoflolwd4getcr ocion C fho sing Sw hol etds in d
Source: Sntm u~srct WiscoNart REGONAL PLwotNo Comtssto, A REGIONAL HOjUIG PLAeN FRo
Soms~rn muo Wiscoresu, P""ttnc Rm'or No. 2D, at 414 (1976).
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FIGURE12- "
PRIORITY HOUSING ANALYSIS AREAS IN THE
REGION FOR NEW SUBSIDIZED HOUSINGI r---
CONSTRUCTION BASED ON EMPLOYMENT





! - 1 .. -. I .th/
""17 - - - .:
I F : -- -I ' . ---,'I'""-
S ..... " . sl b . . , _ . . . . I . ,. . -
r  I.
- . ; - . . . - - --
Source: Soum mRr.n. WscoNSw ioNLo PLr w w; C,,, m m C ON , A R ion? HorstM PUN OR
SoUTuS RN WiscoNsmN, PLANNING RzoRT No. 20, at 432 (1975).

